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Abstract 
The role of infrastructure-less mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) in ubiquitous networks is out-
lined. In a MANET there are no dedicated routers and all network nodes must contribute to rout-
ing. Classification of routing protocols for MANET is based on how routing information is ac-
quired and maintained by mobile nodes and/or on roles of network nodes in a routing. According 
to the first classification base, MANET routing protocols are proactive, reactive, or hybrid com-
binations of proactive and reactive protocols. According to the role-based classification, MANET 
routing protocols are either uniform when all network nodes have the same role or non-uniform 
when the roles are different and dedicated. A contemporary review of MANET routing protocols 
is briefly presented. Security attacks against MANET routing can be passive and or active. The 
purpose of the former is information retrieval, for example network traffic monitoring, while the 
latter is performed by malicious nodes with the express intention of disturbing, modifying or in-
terrupting MANET routing. An overview of active attacks based on modification, impersona-
tion/spoofing, fabrication, wormhole, and selfish behavior is presented. The importance of cryp-
tography and trust in secure MANET routing is also outlined, with relevant security extensions of 
existing routing protocols for MANETs described and assessed. A comparison of existing se-
cure routing protocols form the main contribution in this paper, while some future re-
search challenges in secure MANET routing are discussed.    
Keywords: MANET, routing protocol, routing security, mobile networks, network security, 
trusted routing, cryptography 
Introduction 
A traditional wireless network has an infrastructure with fixed base stations for mobile network 
hosts and/or mobile networks. As computing devices are getting smaller and integrated into vari-
ous systems, such as phones, vehicles, sensors, homes, health care systems, military equipment 
etc. the trend is moving towards ubiquitous, infrastructure-less and self-configuring wireless net-
works, such as mobile ad hoc networks 
(MANETs). In a MANET every net-
work host is also a base station for other 
network hosts and therefore network 
communications can be established on 
demand without the need for fixed net-
work equipment.  While MANETs bring 
many attractive features for future net-
work communications they also intro-
duce many challenges related to (Taneja 
& Kush, 2010): 
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 unicast routing 
 multicast routing 
 dynamic network topology 
 speed 
 frequency of updates or network overhead 
 scalability 
 mobile agent based routing 
 Quality of Service (QoS) 
 energy efficient/power aware routing 
 secure routing 
Infrastructure-less networks are more vulnerable to routing attacks than their structured counter-
parts, since there are no dedicated routers and each network node takes part of the routing pro-
cess. While routing packets can in theory be protected using cryptographic measures it must be 
taken into account that MANET nodes often consist of hardware restricted devices, such as small 
chips and sensors, where cryptography would incur a significant computational cost.  Further-
more, in dynamic MANETs, where hosts are continuously joining and leaving the network, it is 
difficult to discern hosts with malicious intentions from legitimate hosts making cryptographic 
measures impossible to implement in practice. An alternative approach to cryptography is trust 
based security mechanisms where each node typically monitors the behaviour of its neighbor 
nodes with the intention to identify suspicious behavior. However, such solutions also typically 
impose a high load on the network making them challenging to implement in hardware restricted 
MANETs. Secure routing is therefore a very significant challenge in MANETs. 
The main contributions in this paper are:  
 a classification of current relevant routing protocols for MANETs and their security ex-
tensions, and 
 a comparison of secure MANET routing protocols in regard to their protection and detec-
tion performance against several security attack types. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, relevant MANET routing 
protocols and how these protocols can be classified is presented, while the following section de-
scribes security attacks against MANET routing protocols. This is followed by a survey of securi-
ty extensions of MANET routing protocols, before some concluding comments and future re-
search objectives are described. 
Routing Protocols for MANETs 
Research on MANETs has nearly 20 years focused on routing and this focus still remains. Several 
routing protocols for MANETs have been proposed and some surveys on these protocols have 
been published (Feeney, 1999; Qin & Kunz, 2004; Liu & Kaiser, 2005; Taneja & Kush, 2010) 
and an IETF Routing Area Working Group MANET (Mobile, 2011) has been active for a decade 
with six currently active Internet drafts.  
 
Routing protocols for MANETs are usually classified into table driven/proactive protocols, on-
demand/reactive protocols, and hybrid protocols based on how routing information is acquired 
and maintained by mobile nodes. Table driven/proactive protocols use a proactive routing 
scheme, in which every network node maintains consistent up-to-date routing information from 
each node to all other nodes in the network. On-demand/reactive protocols are based on a reactive 
routing scheme, in which at least one route is established only when needed. A hybrid routing 
protocol is a combination of proactive and reactive schemes with the aim of exploiting the ad-
vantages of both types of protocols. (Qin & Kunz, 2004; Liu & Kaiser, 2005; Abusalah, Khokhar 
& Guizani, 2008; Singh, 2011) 
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Another classification into uniform and non-uniform routing protocols for MANETs is based on 
the network node roles in a routing scheme. In a uniform routing protocol all network nodes have 
the same role, importance and functionality. In a non-uniform routing protocol some network 
nodes carry out distinct management and/or routing functions. A uniform routing protocols is ei-
ther reactive or proactive, while different classification schemes have been proposed for non-
uniform routing protocol (Feeney, 1999; Liu & Kaiser, 2005)  
 
In this section some relevant reactive, proactive, and hybrid routing protocols for MANETs are 
presented.  
Table Driven/Proactive Protocols 
Typical table driven protocols are highly dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector Rout-
ing (DSDV) (Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994) and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) (Clausen & 
Jacquet, 2003).  
Table driven routing protocols have a low route acquisition delay because every node always has 
a fresh route to all other nodes in the network. However, the storage, bandwidth, and power re-
quirements are high since each node must keep its routing table up-to date (with route infor-
mation to all other nodes) which mandates periodic routing message exchanges (Mohseni et al., 
2010). 
On Demand/Reactive Protocols 
On-demand protocols incur a much lower load on the network, compared to table driven, since 
each node does not need to constantly keep their routing tables up-to-date. However, route acqui-
sition delay is high since routing messages must be exchanged every time before communication 
is possible over a new route (Mohseni et al., 2010). Two prominent MANET routing protocols, 
based on reactive routing schemes, are Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) (Perkins et 
al., 2003) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) (Johnson et al., 2007), which will now be respec-
tively considered. 
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)  
In AODV, when a node wants to communicate with another, the source node floods the network 
with route request (RREQ) messages. If a node that receives a RREQ packet is not the destina-
tion or doesn't have a fresh route to the destination it creates a reverse route to the source (a route 
back to source with the node from where the RREQ came from as next hop). If the receiver of a 
RREQ is the destination node, it sends a route reply (RREP) message back to the source as a 
unicast packet over the route it received the RREQ. The destination node only sends a RREP to 
the first RREQ message it receives. Every node receiving a RREP also creates a route to the des-
tination in the routing table. As a result, when the RREP reaches the source, all nodes in the 
shortest route path will have a route both to the source and destination.  
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
As with AODV, DSR floods the network with route request messages as a result of route discov-
ery initiation. However, compared with AODV, the destination node returns a route reply for 
each copy of route request message it receives. As a result, the source node will know more than 
one route to the destination node upon reception of all route replies. The addresses of all nodes 
through which both route request and route reply messages have traversed are added to the rout-
ing message headers, so a node knows not only the hop count values of all routes to a destination, 
but also all the intermediate nodes. Based on hop count and other route information, the source 
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node finally selects the route with the lowest latency. Each data packet carries, in its header, the 
complete ordered list of intermediate nodes through which a packet is to be transmitted.   
DSR has lower network overheads compared with AODV, mainly due to the multiple storage and 
source routing features. If a link fails, the source node does not need to re-initiate route discovery, 
as in AODV. Instead it selects another route from its routing table. Since the route information is 
included in all data packets, other nodes forwarding or overhearing any data packet can cache the 
routing information for future use, which also eliminates the need for route discovery if the route 
is still fresh. 
Hybrid Protocols 
A proactive scheme is used to discover routes to nearby nodes and reactive schemes are used to 
discover long distance nodes. An example of a hybrid routing protocol is Zone Routing Protocol 
(ZRP) (Haas et al., 2002). ZRP is also called a hierarchical routing protocol where the network 
can be grouped in clusters, trees, or zones where one node is chosen to be a leader that manages 
that particular routing area.  
Hybrid protocols provide a lower route acquisition delay than reactive protocols and a lower 
overhead than proactive protocols. These protocols, however, are not suitable for highly dynamic 
MANET environments since in such network conditions it is simply infeasible to delegate roles to 
nodes and divide the network into zones.   
Criteria for Routing Protocol Selection  
The performance of a routing MANET protocol depends on a myriad of features, including for 
example, the MANET size defined by network node count and the geographical dimension, the 
rate of nodes joining and leaving the MANET, the distribution of existence times of available 
routes between network nodes, the mobility of the nodes, available network communication 
bandwidth, as well as processing and memory resources of the nodes. To define the best routing 
protocol for a specific MANET is therefore an intractable task, with the selection criteria requir-
ing empirical research and experimentation with different MANET scenarios and different rout-
ing protocols. 
Security Attacks against Routing in MANETs 
Security attacks in MANET routing can be divided in two main types, passive attacks and active 
attacks. The intention of a passive attack is typically to listen and retrieve vital information inside 
data packets, for example by launching a traffic monitoring attack. In such an attack, a malicious 
node tries to identify communication parties and functionality which can provide information to 
launch further attacks. The attack type is called passive since the normal functionality of the net-
work is not altered. 
An active attack is performed by a malicious node with the intention to interrupt the routing func-
tionality of a MANET. Examples include (Tomar et al., 2010; Goyal et al., 2010; Garg & Maha-
patra, 2009; Wang, Hu & Zhi, 2008): 
- Modification attacks 
- Impersonation attacks 
- Fabrication attacks 
- Wormhole attacks 
- Selfish behavior. 
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Modification Attacks 
A modification attack is typically launched by a malicious node with the deliberate intention of 
redirecting routing packets, by for example modifying the hop count value of a routing packet to 
a smaller value. By decreasing the hop count value a malicious node can attract more network 
communication. A typical modification attack is the black hole attack where a malicious node 
uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets 
it wants to intercept. As a result, the target node will send its packets through the malicious node 
when communicating with the destination node. The malicious node can choose to either drop the 
packets or place itself on the route as the first step in what is known popularly as either the man-
in-the-middle (MITM) or a SYBIL attack. 
A modification attack can also be a special kind of denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In this situa-
tion the intention is to destruct the entire routing function by altering the source routes in the 
header of the routing packet. A DoS attack however, is only effective on routing protocols where 
intermediate nodes are included in the packet header, such as DSR.  
Impersonation/Spoofing Attacks 
In this type of attack (also known as spoofing) a malicious node uses for example the IP or ad-
dress of another node in outgoing routing packets. As a result, the malicious node can receive 
packets meant for the other node or even completely isolate it from the network.  
Fabrication 
The main purpose of fabrication attacks is to drain off limited resources in other MANET nodes, 
such as battery power and network connectivity by, for example, flooding a specific node with 
unnecessary routing messages. A malicious node can for example send out false route error mes-
sages. This kind of attack is more prominent in reactive routing protocols where path mainte-
nance is used to recover broken links. 
In a fabrication attack a malicious node can also attempt to create routes to nodes that do not ex-
ist. As a result, the routing table of a neighbor node can become full which prevents the registra-
tion of any new routes. This type of fabrication attack, which is a DoS attack, is only effective on 
table-driven routing protocols where each node in the network keeps an up-to-date route to all 
other nodes in the network.    
A fabrication attack can also be launched by a selfish node that duplicates the transmission of 
packets to another node, just to make sure all packets will reach the destination node. This behav-
ior may lead to an excessively high network traffic load.  
Wormhole Attacks 
A wormhole (Hu et al., 2002c; Liu et al. 2007; Sanzgiri et al., 2002) is a particularly severe attack 
on MANET routing. A malicious node captures packets from one location in a network and tun-
nels them to another malicious node, located several hops away, which forwards the packets to its 
neighboring nodes. This creates the illusion that two endpoints of a wormhole tunnel are neigh-
bors even though they are located far away from each other in reality. A strategic placement of a 
wormhole causes most of the network traffic to pass through the malicious nodes which have 
formed the wormhole. Once the wormhole link has been successfully established, further attacks 
can be launched by the malicious nodes such as selective packet drop to disrupt communication 
or data sniffing to capture confidential information for example.  
There are two classes of wormhole attacks (Khabbazian et al., 2006): hidden mode (HM) and par-
ticipation mode (PM). In the former, HM wormhole nodes are invisible from legitimate nodes as 
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they do not process routing packets. They simply capture, tunnel and forward packets to each 
other and never appear in routing tables. In contrast, PM wormhole nodes are visible during the 
routing process since they process routing packets as any normal node. Aside from relaying rout-
ing packets to its neighbors, a PM wormhole node tunnels routing packets to the other PM node, 
giving it the opportunity to deleteriously control network performance. 
A shortcut link between two HM or PM wormhole nodes can be established using either an in-
band (I-B) or out-of-band (O-B) channel. An I-B channel is one where the wormhole nodes tun-
nel packets to each other through legitimate nodes in the network, while an O-B channel connects 
the two malicious nodes through an external communication link like a network cable or direc-
tional antenna. 
Selfish Behavior 
This refers to a node which does not cooperate in any routing. It may for example, be that it wish-
es to save energy and so switches to a “sleep mode” whenever it is not taking part in any network 
communication. While such an attack may not be launched with explicitly bad intentions, it can 
lead to serious disruptions in network communications such as high route discovery delays and 
dropped data packets. If the selfish node also happens to be the only communication link between 
two MANET endpoints, communications between these endpoints will become unavailable. 
Secure Routing Protocols for MANETs 
Most routing protocols have been designed without taking security into account. It has been as-
sumed that all nodes in a MANET are trusted. However, this is not the case in a large scale and 
dynamic MANET and if the routing protocol is unprotected, the whole MANET can be liable to 
several different types of security attacks. Much research has been done in the area of routing se-
curity in MANETs and several surveys on this research have been published (Abusalah, Khokhar 
& Guizani, 2008; Wang, Hu & Zhi, 2008; Djenouri & Badache, 2010; Singh, 2011). Due to the 
dominant status of reactive routing protocols for MANETs, most security research has tended to 
give attention to these protocols.  
Secure routing protocols for MANETs are usually derived as extensions of existing routing pro-
tocols, see Table 1. Security extensions are cryptographic and/or trust-based. Trust and security 
are closely interrelated concept. Using trust can result in considerable security enhancement in a 
network. The main features of trust within a MANET are defined as (Ramana, Chari & Ka-
siviswanth, 2010): 
1. A decision method to determine trust against an entity should be fully distributed since the 
existence of a trusted third party (such as a trusted centralized certification authority) cannot 
be assumed. 
2. Trust should be determined in a highly customizable manner without excessive computation 
and communication load, while also capturing the complexities of the trust relationship.  
3. A trust decision framework for MANETs should not assume that all nodes are cooperative. In 
resource-restricted environments, selfishness is likely to be prevalent over cooperation, for 
example, in order to save battery life or computational power. 
4. Trust is dynamic, not static. 
5. Trust is subjective. 
6. Trust is not necessarily transitive. The fact that A trusts B and B trusts C does not imply that 
A trusts C. 
7. Trust is asymmetric and not necessarily reciprocal. 
8. Trust is context-dependent. A may trust B as a wine expert but not as a car fixer. Similarly, in 
MANETs, if a given task requires high computational power, a node with high computational 
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power is regarded as trusted while a node that has low computational power but is not mali-
cious (i.e., honest) is distrusted. 
Table 1: Security extensions of some MANET routing protocols. 
Reactive Protocols Proactive Protocols Hybrid Protocols 
DSR 
 SQoS Route Discovery 
 Ariadne 
 Confidant 
DSDV 
 SEAD 
ZRP 
 SRP 
AODV 
 CORE 
 SAODV 
 TAODV 
 SAR 
OLSR 
 SLSP 
 
Others 
 SPREAD 
 ARAN 
  
 
The security extensions of the existing MANET routing protocols in Table 1 are cryptographic 
except QoS Route Discovery (Maltz, 1999), Confidant (Buchegger & Boudec, 2002), and 
TAODV (Li, Lyu & Liu, 2004; Pushpa, 2009), which are trust-based. An experimental compari-
son of two security extensions of AODV (Perkins et al., 2003) – the cryptographic security exten-
sion SAODV and the trust-based security extension TAODV – is provided in (Cordasco & Wet-
zel, 2007). Many secure proposals for secure routing in MANETs have concentrated on protect-
ing MANETs from specific routing attacks, especially the wormhole attack. A recent proposal for 
trust-based routing decisions in MANETs has been shown to provide complete protection against 
all type of wormhole attacks in realistic network deployment situations (Karlsson, Dooley & 
Pulkkis, 2011). The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the relevant security ex-
tensions of the existing MANET routing protocols summarised in Table 1. 
Trust Based Secure Routing 
In this subsection, the three trust-based MANET routing protocols: QoS Route Discovery, Confi-
dant and TAODV are reviewed. An overview of trust-based routing schemes in MANETs is pro-
vided in (Patmaik & Gore, 2011). 
Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Dynamic Ad hoc Networks 
(Confidant) 
The main idea of Confidant (Buchegger & Boudec, 2002) is to make non cooperative nodes unat-
tractive for other nodes to communicate with. A node chooses a route based on trust relationships 
built up from experienced, observed or reported routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes. 
Each node observes the behavior of all nodes located within the radio range. When a node dis-
covers a misbehaving node, it informs all other nodes in the network by flooding an alarm mes-
sage. As a result, all nodes in the network can avoid the detected misbehaving node when choos-
ing a route.  
Thus Confidant effectively detects non cooperative nodes such as selfish nodes and PM worm-
hole nodes that drop data packets. HM wormhole nodes and PM wormhole nodes that do not drop 
packets are, however, not detected. Moreover, a major weakness of Confidant is that an attacker 
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is able to send false alarm messages, and as a consequence the attacker can claim that a node is 
misbehaving even if that is not true. 
Trusted AODV (TAODV) 
In TAODV route selection is based on quantitative Route Trust and Node Trust values (Pushpa, 
2009; Pirzada & McDonald, 2004).  
Route Trust from a source node to a destination node is defined as the difference between the 
number of packets sent from the source node and the number of related packets received by the 
destination node. Route Trust is thus 0 for a perfect route and trustworthiness decreases for grow-
ing Route Trust values.  
For calculation of Node Trust each node monitors the behavior of all neighbor nodes by counting 
both successes and failures of events such as Control Packets Received, Control Packets For-
warded, Data Packets Received, Data Packets Forwarded, Route Established etc. Node Trust val-
ue for a certain monitored event type is (Rs-Rf )/( Rs+Rf), where Rs and Rf  are the number of suc-
cessful and failed events respectively. This value will lie between +1 (complete trust) and -1 
(complete mistrust). Node Trust for a neighbor node is weighted sum of the trust values for all 
monitored event types. The weights are dynamically assigned values between 0 and 1based on 
circumstances and chosen criteria. 
For route selection RT = 0.4 * (Hop Count) + 0.6 * (Route Trust) and the 3 neighbor nodes are 
selected from which the routes with lowest RT values start. For each selected node an average 
Node Trust is calculated from the monitored Trust Values of neighbor nodes. The route starting 
from the node with the highest average Node Trust is selected.   
QoS Route Discovery 
In (Maltz, 1999) a QoS-Guided route discovery protocol for MANETs is presented. In this proto-
col a node specifies route trust by traditional QoS metrics, bandwidth, latency and jitter that must 
be satisfied by a discovered route. 
Cryptography based Secure Routing 
In this subsection the cryptography-based secure routing protocols in Table 1 are presented. 
Securing QoS Route Discovery (SQoS Route Discovery) 
SQoS Route Discovery (Hu & Johnson, 2004) is a cryptographically protected version of QoS 
Route Discovery. SQoS Route Discovery relies entirely on symmetric cryptography. 
Ariadne 
Ariadne (Hu et al., 2002a) is a secure reactive (on-demand) routing protocol based on DSR that 
provides authentication of routing messages. Authentication can be performed by using shared 
secrets between each pair of nodes, shared secrets between communicating nodes combined with 
broadcast authentication, or digital signatures. Ariadne is based on the Timed Efficient Stream 
Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) protocol (Perrig et al., 2005) which is a broadcast authen-
tication procedure requiring relaxed time synchronization. It consists of two steps:  
1. authentication of routing messages 
2. verification that there is no node missing in the routing message headers 
In step 1, if shared secrets are used, a node sending a routing request message indicates a message 
authentication code (MAC) which is computed with a shared secret key over a time stamp (or 
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other unique data). The receiver of the message can then authenticate the message by using its 
own shared secret key.   
In step 2, per-hop hashing is used to verify that no hop was omitted. Authentication of routing 
messages is not enough since an attacker could still remove a node from the list of intermediate 
nodes in a routing message. Ariadne though uses a one-way hash function to prevent this.  
Ariadne provides good defense against modification, fabrication, and spoofing due to its message 
authentication and routing message header verification features. Ariadne can also provide protec-
tion from HM wormhole attacks, when used together with the TESLA Instant Key disclosure 
(TIK) protocol for precise time synchronization between neighbouring nodes, and PM wormhole 
attacks if the wormhole nodes do not have valid shared secrets. 
Secure AODV (SAODV) 
SAODV (Zapata & Asokan, 2002) was introduced to protect the routing messages of the original 
AODV protocol. In SAODV, digital signatures are used to authenticate RREQ and RREP mes-
sages and hash chains are used to authenticate the hop-count fields within the RREQ and RREP 
messages.  
The source node selects a random seed number in the beginning of the route discovery process 
and sets a maximum hop count (MHC) value. The source node then computes a hash value by 
using a hash function as h(seed) and Top_Hash as hMHC(seed). An intermediate node checks, after 
reception of a RREQ, whether the Top_Hash value equals hMHC-Hop_Count (Hash). If it does, the in-
termediate node assumes the hop count value has not been altered. The intermediate node then 
increments the hop-count value in the RREQ header and computes a new hash value by hashing 
the old value (h(Hash)), before rebroadcasting the RREQ messages to its neighbors.  
Since all other fields of the RREQ message are non-mutable they can be authenticated by verify-
ing the signature in the RREQ. The RREQ message is signed by the private key of the source 
node and the RREP message is signed by the private key of the destination node. By doing this, 
both the source and the destination can identify its communication partner and avoid impersona-
tion attacks. The intermediate nodes are verifying the signatures in both the RREQ and RREP 
messages as well and only store a forward or reverse route entry in their routing tables if the sig-
nature in the routing message can be verified.  
Security Aware Ad hoc Routing (SAR) 
The SAR protocol (Yi et al., 2001) incorporates security attributes as parameters into ad hoc route 
discovery. It enables the use of security as a negotiable metric with the intention to improve the 
relevance of the discovered routes. While AODV discovers the shortest path between two nodes, 
SAR can discover a path with desired security attributes. For instance, the criteria for a valid 
route can be that every node in the route must own a particular shared key. In such a case, routing 
messages would be encrypted with the source node's shared key and only the nodes with the cor-
rect key can read the header and forward that routing message. As a result, if a routing message 
reaches the destination, it must have been traveled through nodes having the same trust level as 
the source node. It is then for the node initiating the route discovery to decide upon the desired 
security level for that route.  
SAR has been presented as an extension to AODV but it can also be extended to any existing 
routing protocol. Due to strong cryptographic protection of routing messages, attacks such as 
modification, impersonation, and fabrication are effectively eliminated. A major problem with 
SAR, however, is that it involves significant encryption overhead since each intermediate node 
has to perform both encryption and decryption operations. 
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Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) 
The purpose of the ARAN protocol (Sanzgiri et al., 2002) is to detect and protect against mali-
cious actions by third parties and peers. It provides authentication, message integrity, and non-
repudiation. ARAN can be used in two different security stages: a simple mode which is manda-
tory and an optional stage which provides stronger security but also more overhead and is not 
suitable on mobile devices with very low processing or battery capacity. ARAN uses crypto-
graphic certificates for authentication and non-repudiation. Each routing message is signed by the 
source node and broadcasted to all neighbors. An intermediate node removes the certificate and 
signature of the previous hop and replaces them with its own.  
Due to strong authentication, message integrity, and non –repudiation ARAN provides effective 
protection from modification, impersonation, and fabrication attacks. However, due to heavy 
asymmetric cryptographic operations and large routing packets, ARAN has a high computational 
cost for route discovery. ARAN is also vulnerable against selfish nodes that e.g. drop routing 
packets. In particular, if the selfish node is an authenticated node, then ARAN is unable to detect 
this type of attack. 
Secure Efficient Ad hoc Networks (SEAD) 
SEAD (Hu et al., 2002b) is a proactive routing protocol based on DSDV. SEAD uses a hash chain 
method for checking the authenticity of data packets and the hash chain value is used for trans-
mitting routing updates. The authentication of each entry of a routing update message is verified 
by a receiving node. Looping is removed by using a sequence number and authentication of the 
source of routing update message. Authentication of the source can be done for example by 
providing a shared secret key between each pair of nodes in the MANET which is then used for 
MAC calculations between the nodes for the authentication of a routing update message. 
SEAD provides strong protection against attackers trying to create incorrect routing state in other 
nodes by for example modifying the sequence number in the routing packet. However, SEAD 
does not protect against an attacker tampering the next hop or the destination field of a routing 
update packet. 
Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP) 
The main functionality of SLSP (Papadimitratos &Haas, 2003) is to secure the discovery and the 
distribution of link state information by using asymmetric keys. SLSP consists of three major 
steps: public key distribution, neighbor discovery, and link state updates. Public keys are distrib-
uted between a node and all its neighbors. A central server for key distribution is thus not needed. 
Periodic hello messages, used in neighbor discovery, are signed using the private key of the send-
er. Signed link state update messages are identified by the IP address of the initiating node and 
include a sequence number. A node receiving a link update messages verifies the attached signa-
ture using the public key it received earlier during the public key distribution phase. The hop 
count field in the update message is protected by using a one-way hash chain.  
DoS attacks are also avoided in SLSP since each node maintains a priority ranking of their neigh-
bor nodes based on the rate of control traffic they have observed. Neighbor nodes that generate 
update packets with the lowest rate are given highest priorities. Thus, malicious neighbors gener-
ating a huge amount of unnecessary update packets will get the lowest priority which limits the 
effectiveness of a DoS attack. 
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) 
SRP (Sanzgiri, 2002) is a protocol designed to secure ZRP but can also be used with pure reactive 
routing protocols. A security association (SA) is required between a source node and a destina-
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tion node. It is assumed that the SA can be established by using a shared key between the two 
communicating nodes. SRP uses an additional header to the underlying on-demand routing proto-
col packet. The header contains a sequence number QSEC, an ID number QID, and a MAC field 
where the output of a key hashed functions is inserted. A route request messages is discarded by 
intermediate nodes if the SRP header is missing.   
When the route request message has reached the destination node it verifies if it has a SA with the 
source node. The route request packet is dropped if QSEC is greater or equal to a QMAX value 
since it is then considered to be replayed. If the QSEC value is valid, the destination calculates 
the keyed hash of the request fields and compares the output with the MAC field of the SRP 
header. If they match the authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the request message are 
verified and the destination generates a route reply message where it includes the path infor-
mation from source to destination, QID, and QSEC. 
The source node validates QSEC and the MAC field in the same way as the destination node. The 
source node also compares the source route (path information) included in the reply message with 
the reverse of the route carried in the reply packet. If they match it can be ensured that the route 
information in the routing packets has not been altered. 
Summary and Discussion 
Table 2 provides a comparative summary of the features of some relevant secure routing proto-
cols, from which the general conclusion can be made that no single routing protocol provides pro-
tection against all forms of routing attacks. It is also notable that the achievable security level is 
highly dependent on both the underlying assumptions and network scenarios employed. 
Table 2: Comparison of the best known secure routing protocols. 
Protocol Based on/type Provides protection from attacks: 
Modifi-
cation 
Imper-
sonation 
Fabri-
cation 
Worm-
hole 
Selfish 
Ariadne DSR/reactive Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Confi-
dant 
DSR/reactive No No No No Yes 
SAODV AODV/reactive Yes Yes Yes No No 
TAODV AODV/reactive Yes No Yes No Yes 
SAR AODV/reactive Yes Yes Yes No No 
ARAN Others/reactive Yes Yes Yes No No 
SEAD DSDV/proactive Weak Yes Yes No No 
SLSP OLSR/proactive Yes Yes Yes No No 
SRP ZRP/hybrid Yes Yes Yes No No 
Conclusions  
Routing security in infrastructure-less and self-configuring mobile networks, such as MANETs, 
has been highlighted as one of the most challenging security issues in current and future ubiqui-
tous networks. Since there are a number of potential MANET security threats and many possible 
network environments (small, scalable, fixed, dynamic, homogeneous, heterogeneous, etc.) it is 
difficult to design a secure routing protocol providing protection from all types of attacks  while 
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at the same time being suitable for all types of MANET scenarios. A comparison of established 
secure routing protocols based on the classification is the main contribution in this paper. 
Further research needs to be undertaken both in in order to provide protection from all possible 
MANET routing attacks and for formulating recommendations on the selection of a secure rout-
ing protocol for a specific MANET, since no single currently proposed routing protocol provides 
protection against all forms of routing attacks in MANETs.  
 In some secure routing protocols based on cryptography different symmetric cryptographic keys 
must be generated for and distributed to all possible pairs of MANET nodes and/or trust in public 
keys of MANET nodes is provided by certification. Research is needed on how generation, distri-
bution and certification of cryptographic keys for nodes entering a MANET can be implemented 
by services, which are distributed among all already accepted MANET nodes. Improvements of 
existing security protocols, intrusion detection systems and security mechanisms for detecting 
specific types of attacks are relevant topics for future research. Use of simulated networks and 
virtual network infrastructures in cloud computing can maintain the expenditure on MANET se-
curity research to a reasonable level. 
Secure routing protocols based on cryptography impose additional computational load on all net-
work nodes and are vulnerable to some types of DoS attacks. Trust-based secure routing proto-
cols are computationally more light-weight and less vulnerable to DoS attacks but can consume 
much communication bandwidth, since each MANET node monitors continuously the behavior 
of a set of other MANET nodes. Search of computationally efficient combinations of cryptog-
raphy and trust-based solutions with low communication bandwidth consumption is therefore an 
important research topic in the development of secure routing protocols for MANETs 
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